What does tis mean




















Just think about "'tis I". Who would ever read that as "this is I"? It's not an unreasonable question, whoever marked it down: the dialect word "tother" shows that a "th" can change to a "t" in contractions.

But it does seem unlikely, and I too wonder which dictionary it was which listed "this is". It is basically just a neuter version of a napron , a nadder , a norange , etc. It's just a different way to contract it is. Vowel deletion is not rocket science, folks. Add a comment. Active Oldest Votes. Thus, "'tis" in your example would it : It is the voice of the lobster.

Other examples are : 'Tis the season to be jolly. A similar expression is 'tiwll. Improve this answer. Thursagen Thursagen Aye, and a good one too. Do you two guys know each other, or is the clash of names just a coincidence? In order to ascertain whether such a project falls within the material scope of the SEA Directive, it must be examined, first, whether it is a plan or programme within the meaning of Article 2 a of that directive and, second, whether it comes under Article 3 2 to 4.

In so far as a plan is developed irrespective of any obligation, there is no need for an environmental assessment under the SEA Directive. According to the submissions made by DEI, it does seem possible that a diversion project may be the subject of a land-use plan provided for by Greek law. However, such a plan is not the subject of the order for reference, but, according to DEI, was not considered to be necessary by the Simvoulio tis Epikratias in an earlier decision. If specific projects require development consent, an environmental assessment under the SEA Directive would likewise not appear to be necessary.

Project development consent is not, in itself, a plan or programme. It is beyond doubt that they are plans within the meaning of the SEA Directive. They must be established under Article 13 of the Water Framework Directive. They were also prepared by an authority for adoption, through a legislative procedure, by Parliament. Under Article 3 1 of the SEA Directive, an environmental assessment, in accordance with Articles 4 to 9, must be carried out for plans and programmes referred to in paragraphs 2 to 4 which are likely to have significant environmental effects.

Under Article 3 2 a of the SEA Directive, an environmental assessment must be carried out for plans which are prepared for water management and which set the framework for future development consent of projects listed in Annexes I and II to the EIA Directive.

The management plans set out the framework for the authorisation of such projects, e. The primary issue is not authorisations of parts of the diversion project, since the management plans were in any case not yet binding under Union law.

However, since the expiry of the time-limit for the production of the management plans any further authorisation of relevant projects must respect the framework set by them. Furthermore, there is also much — in the present case at least — to support the presumption that a duty to assess exists under Article 3 2 b of the SEA Directive.

That provision covers plans which, in view of the likely effect on sites, have been determined to require an assessment pursuant to Article 6 or 7 of the Habitats Directive. Protection areas under that directive fall within the scope of the management plans. They could be affected in the application of the plans, in particular where those plans provide for the diversion of waters to a significant degree. It must therefore be stated that management plans within the meaning of Article 13 of the Water Framework Directive must, in principle, be subjected to an environmental assessment under the SEA Directive.

It is therefore also necessary to clarify the eighth question, namely whether measures which concerned the project at issue and have been annulled with retroactive effect by court orders can be considered to be formal preparatory acts which were issued before 21 July so that there is no obligation to prepare a strategic environmental report. This question concerns the first sentence of Article 13 3 of the SEA Directive, which, with reference to the period for implementation under Article 13 1 , defines the general rule for the application of the directive: plans and programmes of which the first formal preparatory act is after 21 July are subject to an environmental assessment.

The development consents which were judicially annulled do not therefore come into question because they were the interim result of a consent procedure. Only steps taken to initiate the consent procedure may be preparatory. It is thus a fortiori irrelevant whether the consent was annulled with retroactive effect. Rather, it is of interest in the main proceedings whether the initiation of the consent procedure may be regarded as a preparatory act for the management plans or whether it may be the preparatory act for a plan to divert the Acheloos.

However, it is clearly designed to provide a reliable criterion for determining the date on which a procedure was initiated.

It thereby provides for legal certainty and contributes to the effectiveness of the directive. In connection with the EIA Directive, the Court has therefore considered informal contacts and meetings between the competent authority and the developer to be insufficient to indicate the date of commencement of a procedure.

Nor can it be sufficient in connection with the SEA Directive to initiate certain procedures relating to projects to which a management plan would relate, e.

It is not clear from such procedure that they also have in view a management plan. Moreover, almost no management plan could be subject to an environmental assessment ratione temporis if procedures for the authorisation of the relevant projects, begun before 21 July , were to be regarded as formal preparatory acts for subsequent management plans.

Within the scope of each management plan there are many such existing projects to which the plan potentially relates, on account of the prohibition of deterioration and the duty to restore under Article 4 of the Water Framework Directive.

Lastly, in this case the chronology also contradicts the claim that initial formal preparatory acts for the management plans were produced before 21 July This suggests that the preparations for their adoption also began only after that date.

The situation would be different if — contrary to the answer to the seventh question — there existed a plan for the partial diversion of the Acheloos, which was subject to an assessment. The arrangements governing preparatory acts are intended to make it possible to conclude current procedures without impairment as a result of fundamentally new procedural conditions. They are not intended, on the other hand, to preclude the environmental assessment of plans merely because some administrative measures have been taken in the past in respect of the same subject-matter.

The crucial factor would therefore be whether the procedure for the authorisation of the plan was continuously in progress. The judicial decisions would not be regarded as an interruption in this connection if the competent authorities immediately took the necessary measures in order to remedy the deficiencies established by the court.

The shift from an administrative procedure to a legislative procedure should also not be regarded as an interruption. The initiation of the procedure for obtaining development consent for the diversion project could therefore be a formal preparatory act for the establishment of a plan relating to that project, which is subject to an assessment. It should also be pointed out that a mandatory assessment under the second sentence of Article 13 3 of the SEA Directive is ruled out in this case.

That comes into consideration if plans and programmes, of which the first formal preparatory act is before 21 July , are adopted or submitted to the legislative procedure more than 24 months thereafter. The answer to the eighth question is therefore that neither annulled consents to a project to divert a river nor the initiation of the corresponding authorisation procedure under Article 13 1 of the SEA Directive may be regarded as formal preparatory acts for river basin district management plans under the Water Framework Directive.

However, the initiation of a development consent procedure could be regarded as a preparatory act for a plan to divert a river which is subject to an assessment if the consent procedure is continuously in progress without interruption.

In view of the answer to the eighth question, the ninth question must also be answered. The Simvoulio tis Epikratias is essentially seeking to ascertain whether an autonomous strategic environmental assessment will have to be conducted if assessments have already been conducted under the Water Framework Directive and under the EIA Directive.

Under Article 11 1 , an environmental assessment carried out under the SEA Directive is without prejudice to any requirements under the EIA Directive and to any other Community law requirements. However, for plans and programmes for which the obligation to carry out assessments of the effects on the environment arises simultaneously from the SEA Directive and other European Union legislation, Article 11 2 permits the Member States to provide for coordinated or joint procedures fulfilling the requirements of the relevant Union legislation in order, inter alia, to avoid duplication of assessment.

Those provisions show that the production of the various environmental assessments under European Union law need not be formalistic. Rather, the important factor is that the conditions laid down in the various rules are implemented.

If this is done, it does not matter how the assessment in question is designated. Whether certain reports on the basis of other provisions satisfy the requirements of the SEA Directive is a question which must be examined by the national courts, having regard to the specific features of each individual case. Such reports must satisfy both the substantive and the procedural requirements of the SEA Directive. It also would not appear to be ruled out that, if the conditions governing a management plan under Article 13 4 and Annex VII of the Water Framework Directive are satisfied, that is sufficient to meet the conditions governing an environmental assessment for the plan under the SEA Directive.

In the light of the comments regarding the EIA Directive, 64 however, it should be pointed out that any deficiencies in the assessment under that directive should, in all likelihood, also be regarded as deficiencies in an environmental assessment under the SEA Directive.

Article 5 2 of the SEA Directive requires, in much clearer terms than the EIA Directive, that the assessment take into account current knowledge and methods of assessment. Article 8 of each directive also requires that information acquired regarding the environmental effects be taken into account in the decision.

The answer to the ninth question is therefore that for the purpose of Article 11 2 of the SEA Directive, if a plan simultaneously falls within the scope of that directive and within that of the Water Framework Directive and the EIA Directive which also require the environmental effects of that scheme to be assessed, no autonomous strategic environmental assessment need be conducted if the assessments which have been drawn up on the basis of the Water Framework Directive and the EIA Directive satisfy the requirements of the SEA Directive substantively and with respect to the procedure followed.

Lastly, it is necessary to examine several questions relating to European Union nature conservation legislation. The Simvoulio tis Epikratias asks about the temporary protection of proposed sites of Community importance SCIs before they have been included in the Community list see section 1 below , the lawfulness of a development consent without knowledge of the birds affected see section 2 below , the justification of damage to sites with reference to the aims of irrigation and drinking water supply see section 3 below , possible measures to maintain coherence see section 4 below and whether it is compatible with the Habitats Directive to convert a natural fluvial ecosystem into a man-made fluvial and lacustrine ecosystem see section 5 below.

The answer to those questions is heavily characterised by the fact that the development consent procedure relating to the partial diversion of the Acheloos has already been in progress for a very long time. It began before the Habitats Directive was adopted. The procedure for the ex-ante assessment of projects under Article 6 3 cannot therefore be applied, but only the prohibition of deterioration under Article 6 2. The Simvoulio tis Epikratias refers to five SCIs 65 which were included in the list by that decision and are affected by the project.

If the date of publication were relevant for inclusion of the sites concerned in the Community list, Article 6 2 , 3 and 4 of the Habitats Directive would have been applicable, under Article 4 5 of that directive, only from 21 September , 66 i.

The Simvoulio tis Epikratias will have to determine the date of notification — for which the database of European Union law EUR-Lex gives the date of the adoption of the decision, 19 July Member States cannot therefore authorise interventions which may pose the risk of seriously compromising the ecological characteristics of a site.

This is particularly the case when an intervention poses the risk either of significantly reducing the area of a site, or of leading to the disappearance of priority species present on the site, or, finally, of having as an outcome the destruction of the site or the destruction of its representative characteristics. However, I will show below that the fact that the procedure for the authorisation of the partial diversion of the Acheloos had already been in progress for some time precludes the application of the ex-ante assessment under Article 6 3.

Instead, Article 6 2 is applicable, possibly in conjunction with the conditions under Article 6 4 governing justification of possible damage to sites. However, the Court has held that where a project has been authorised before the expiry of the time-limit for transposing the Habitats Directive or the procedure for authorisation was initiated prior to the date of accession of the Member State concerned to the European Union, it would not be subject to the requirements under Article 6 3 of the Habitats Directive relating to the procedure for prior assessment of the implications of the project for the site concerned.

The procedure for obtaining development consent for the partial diversion of the Acheloos began in the early s — that is to say possibly before the adoption of the Habitats Directive — and was not subject to the ex-ante assessment procedure until notification of the decision on the Community list with regard to the SCIs concerned. Furthermore, it was difficult in practice to foresee when the Commission would adopt the Community list.

Under Article 4 2 of the Habitats Directive, the list was to be drawn up by , and other sub-lists had been notified long before the list for Mediterranean biogeographical regions, which covers Greece.

There was consequently no need for an assessment of the implications for the SCIs under Article 6 3 of the Habitats Directive. However, the abovementioned case-law concerns only the procedural aspects of the protective regime under the Habitats Directive. The Court has, on the other hand, repeatedly held that the substantive requirements governing the protection of sites, laid down in Article 6 2 of the Habitats Directive, are not excluded by existing development consents.

That provision prohibits the deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species in the special areas of conservation, as well as disturbance of the species for which the areas have been designated, in so far as such disturbance could be significant in relation to the objectives of the directive. The Court has held that application of Article 6 2 of the Habitats Directive makes it possible to satisfy the essential objective of the preservation and protection of the quality of the environment, including the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, as stated in the first recital in the preamble to that directive, where a plan authorised under Article 6 3 or project subsequently proves likely to give rise to such deterioration or disturbance, even where the competent national authorities cannot be held responsible for any error.

Consequently, Article 6 2 of the Habitats Directive requires Member States to take the necessary steps to avoid the deterioration and disturbance of protected areas also in relation to existing projects. The legitimate interests of the holders of authorisations must, where necessary, be satisfied by means of compensation. The foregoing case-law is not at odds with the prohibition on the retroactive application of rules of law. On the contrary, a new rule of law applies, in principle, from its entry into force.

While it does not apply to legal situations which have become established and definitive under the old law, it does apply to their future effects. Article 6 2 of the Habitats Directive — like Article 4 4 of the Birds Directive in relation to the protection of de facto bird protection areas — does not provide for a ground of justification based on overriding interests.

After all, the protection of sites under the Habitats Directive is based on the idea that the deterioration or significant disturbance of protected areas must always be authorised and, where so authorised, justified in accordance with Article 6 3 and 4.

Moreover, where such authorisation is based on an appropriate assessment of the implications for the site in question, there is in principle no scope for the application of Article 6 2. In the present case, by contrast, Article 6 3 and 4 of the Habitats Directive was not even yet applicable.

It would, however, be unreasonable to deny to projects which, for reasons of date, are not subject to the prior assessment under Article 6 3 and 4 the possibility of being authorised by way of derogation, as provided for in Article 6 4.

Those projects would be more severely restricted than later projects, to which the provisions of Article 6 2 to 4 apply in their entirety. In the case of old projects , therefore, the deterioration or significant disturbance of protected areas must also be permitted under Article 6 2 of the Habitats Directive where the material conditions laid down in Article 6 4 are present, that is to say imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature, the absence of an alternative solution and compensatory measures to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura is protected.

The conditions governing justification will be examined in detail below in connection with the answers to the subsequent questions. The answer to the tenth question is therefore that, prior to the notification of the Community list of sites of Community importance SCIs , the Member States were required under the Habitats Directive, for the areas which were included in the national lists of SCIs and, ultimately, were included in the Community list, to take appropriate protective measures in order to maintain the characteristics of those sites.

By the eleventh question, the Simvoulio tis Epikratias would like to know whether is it possible for the competent national authorities to grant development consent for a project for the diversion of waters in the absence of reliable and updated data regarding the birds in the protection area concerned.

The Prefectural Authority of Magnisia objects that the Simvoulio tis Epikratias could not, under its procedural rules, establish the absence of information regarding the birds, and for that reason the question referred for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible. However, this objection cannot be accepted. In preliminary ruling proceedings, the Court is, in principle, bound by the information provided by the referring court and may not review whether the court has exceeded its powers under national law.

The eleventh question must therefore be answered. The first sentence of Article 6 3 of the Habitats Directive would normally be relevant in this regard.

However, since the authorisation procedure has already been in progress for a long time, that provision is not applicable. Article 6 2 applies instead. The ex-ante assessment under the first sentence of Article 6 3 of the Habitats Directive is relevant in principle to the authorisation of projects and the information to be consulted in this regard.

Such an assessment should rely on the best scientific knowledge relating to the birds in the area concerned. As has already been explained, 86 the first sentence of Article 6 3 of the Habitats Directive is not applicable to the SCIs concerned, but that provision could be applied with regard to the relevant special protection areas under the Birds Directive, which have been previously identified. Under Article 7 of the Habitats Directive, Article 6 2 , 3 and 4 apply to such areas as from the date of its implementation or the date of classification or recognition by a Member State, where the latter date is later.

The Habitats Directive became applicable upon the expiry of the implementation period in The first sentence of Article 6 3 was thus applicable at the earliest from that date and at the latest as from the subsequent identification of the relevant SPAs. However, the development consent procedure for the partial diversion of the Acheloos began before , as the first consents were issued in The development consent procedure must therefore be regarded as having been initiated before the first sentence of Article 6 3 of the Habitats Directive was applicable.

The case-law cited above regarding development consent procedures which were initiated before the introduction of significant changes to procedural law 88 thus precludes an obligation to conduct an assessment of the implications for the site under that provision. On the other hand, Article 6 2 of the Habitats Directive is applicable. The need for the application of that provision is even more evident in the case of bird protection areas than in the case of protection areas under the Habitats Directive, namely the SCIs.

Bird protection areas have had to be classified in Greece since the expiry of the period for transposition of the Birds Directive, 6 April In this case it must therefore be examined whether the approved project causes the habitats of birds, for which the SPA was identified, to deteriorate or disturbs those species in a way which could be significant in the light of the objectives of the directive.

If such deteriorations or disturbances are established, it will also be necessary to examine whether they can be justified on the basis of the substantive criteria laid down in Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive. As has already been explained, any justification requires a weighing up process, the examination of alternatives and compensatory measures.

While it is true that a formal assessment of the implications for the site in question, in accordance with Article 6 3 of the Habitats Directive, is not required, the discretion enjoyed by the Member States in the acceptance of a ground of justification is none the less subject to limits. The Court has found that Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive can apply only after the implications of a plan or project have been studied in accordance with Article 6 3 of that directive.

Knowledge of those implications in the light of the conservation objectives relating to the site in question is a necessary prerequisite for application of Article 6 4. Without it, no condition for application of that derogating provision can be assessed. The assessment of any imperative reasons of overriding public interest and that of the existence of less harmful alternatives require a weighing up exercise against the damage caused to the site by the plan or project under consideration.

In addition, in order to determine the nature of any compensatory measures, the damage to the site must be precisely identified. Consequently, in connection with the justification of damage under Article 6 2 of the Habitats Directive too, it is necessary carefully and impartially to examine all the relevant elements of the individual case and, in so doing, to ensure that those elements are capable of supporting the conclusions drawn from them.

The effects can be properly assessed only on the basis of reliable and updated data regarding the birds in the relevant areas. Otherwise, purely hypothetical adverse effects would find their way into the weighing up exercise, the examination of alternatives and the determination of compensatory measures. It would not be certain that actual damage is taken into account. The answer to the eleventh question is therefore that it is possible, for the purpose of Article 6 2 of the Habitats Directive, for the competent national authorities to grant development consent for a project for the diversion of waters which causes a deterioration in the habitats of birds for which the SPA was identified, or disturbs those species in a way which could be significant in the light of the objectives of the directive, only if that project is justified on the basis of reliable and updated data regarding the birds in the relevant SPAs.

By the twelfth question, the Simvoulio tis Epikratias wishes to know whether grounds for undertaking a project to divert waters that relate principally to irrigation and secondarily to drinking water supply can justify damage to a protection area.

The twelfth question relates to the first of the conditions under Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive, namely imperative reasons of overriding public interest, including those of a social or economic nature. As has already been established in connection with the Water Framework Directive, irrigation and drinking water supply may be such reasons in principle. Because the Commission has not delivered an opinion in the present case, the number of possible justifying interests is severely limited by the wording of the second subparagraph of Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive.

Irrigation would not be an interest which could justify the project, as it would not be necessary either for human health, public safety, or beneficial consequences of primary importance for the environment. Drinking water supply, on the other hand, would be a consideration relating to human health. However, it would be inappropriate to apply the more stringent conditions governing justification of adverse effects if the priority elements of the relevant sites are not damaged.

Since the Commission has publicly expressed this position, there is no need in such cases for its opinion before invoking other interests. The Simvoulio tis Epikratias must therefore ascertain whether priority elements of the sites concerned are damaged, and whether therefore more stringent conditions governing possible justification apply.

Furthermore, the reasons for a project are imperative and overriding only if they have greater importance than its negative effects on the areas protected by the Habitats Directive. The answer to the twelfth question is therefore that both irrigation and drinking water supply are imperative reasons of overriding public interest within the meaning of Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive for a project to divert waters, if those reasons outweigh the adverse effects of that project on the sites protected by the directive.

If, however, priority habitat types or species are damaged, only drinking water supply is a possible justification in the absence of an opinion delivered by the Commission. By the thirteenth question, the Simvoulio tis Epikratias wishes to ascertain whether in determining the sufficiency of the compensatory measures criteria such as the extent of that diversion and the scale of the works which the diversion entails should be taken into account. This question concerns the third condition for a justification of damage to protection areas under Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive, namely the compensatory measures necessary to ensure that, despite the damage to a site, the overall coherence of Natura is protected.

Contrary to the wording of questions 13 and 14, it does not relate to the coherence of individual sites, but the coherence of the network of protection areas. According to Article 3 1 of the Habitats Directive, Natura is a coherent European ecological network of special areas of conservation. This network is composed of sites hosting the natural habitat types listed in Annex I and habitats of the species listed in Annex II, and of the SPAs for the bird species mentioned in Annex I to the Birds Directive and for regularly occurring migratory species.

The necessary measures can therefore be identified only in relation to the damage to the area in question. Thus, the Court has previously found that in order to determine the nature of any compensatory measures, the damage to the site must be precisely identified. The answer to the thirteenth question is therefore that in determining the sufficiency of the compensatory measures which are necessary, within the meaning of Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive, to ensure that the overall coherence of Natura is protected, criteria such as the extent of the diversion of a river and the scale of the works which the diversion entails should be taken into account if they damage Natura protection areas.

By the fourteenth question, the Simvoulio tis Epikratias is seeking to ascertain whether the Habitats Directive, interpreted in the light of the principle of sustainable development as enshrined in Article 6 EC now Article 11 TFEU , permits the conversion of a natural fluvial ecosystem into a man-made fluvial and lacustrine ecosystem.

In all likelihood, the conversion of a natural fluvial ecosystem into a man-made fluvial and lacustrine ecosystem, i. This would have to be assessed specifically having regard to the relevant conservation objectives. However, any deterioration does not mean that the diversion project in question would be unlawful in any event. It might be justified on the basis of the criteria under Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive.

The principle of sustainability must be taken into account in connection with the justification, that is to say in assessing the reasons of public interest, the damage and alternatives. If the project cannot achieve its objectives sustainably, or can do only partially, the weight of those objectives in the balancing of interests is reduced. Thus, merely temporary damage has less weight than sustained damage.

The answer to the fourteenth question is therefore that a project to divert waters within a Natura area, which would convert a natural fluvial ecosystem into a man-made fluvial and lacustrine ecosystem, may be approved if the conditions under Article 6 4 of the Habitats Directive are satisfied. I propose that the Court give the following answers to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling:. However, they may be regarded as preparatory acts for a plan to divert a river which is subject to an assessment if the consent procedure is continuously in progress without interruption.

I have already considered these ideas in the discussion of the advance effects of the Water Framework Directive during the transitional period for the establishment of management plans and programmes of measures; see above, point et seq. Thus, for example, new rules of law on the protection of patents may restrict the scope of the protection afforded by existing patents see Monsanto Technology , paragraph Skip to main content.

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